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Abstract 
The key concept of information science is the concept of information which is tied to a 
number of complications. The main problem is that there is no definition of this 
concept. The purpose of this article is an analysis of the concept of information from 
the position of classical logic. The main method of the article is a conceptual analysis. 
First, we briefly deal with the overview of the concepts of information, with concepts 
and their definition as such and with the scope of the concept of information. Then, we 
provide an analysis of 31 important definitions of the concept of information which 
were developed within the scope of information science and related fields, and we 
consider relations between the concept of information and the concepts in other 
disciplines. Conceptual analysis of the concept of information leads to the conclusion 
that information is probably a concept that somehow addresses the entire reality, thus 
that it is a term, which is in the classical logic described as transcendental. This fact, in 
the view of the fact that information science is a special field, seems to be a serious 
methodological problem. Problems associated with the broadness of the concept of 
information have three possible solutions: transformation of information science into 
the universal science, narrowing the concept of information to a special term, or 
replacement of the concept of information by a different one. At the end of the article, 
we briefly point out our solution to the problem. 
Keywords: concept of information, scope of the concept, information science, 
definitions, conceptual analysis 
1. Introduction  
There are many definitions of the term information, without any of them being 
accepted in general, and each definition, the number of which continues to grow, 
fundamentally differ from one another [36, p. 27]. This situation can be described as 
a paradox, considering the fact that information is often understood as a reduction of 
uncertainty [11, p. 351]. 
Because of this problem, some authors stop asking what the information is, but 
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It seems, therefore, that it is necessary to proceed to a more radical revision of this 
term. Such a revision, however, cannot be done without a thorough epistemological 
and logical analysis of the concept of information. 
The aim of this article therefore isn’t to extend the range of definitions of 
information, but rather to contribute to the epistemological and logical debate over the 
nature of this term.  
The paper will attempt to respond to two central questions, namely 
 
 What sort of concept does information represent in view of scope? 
 How does such classification affect information science as a discipline? 
In order to find appropriate responses, we need to clarify the following problems: 
 
 What do concepts mean for the related scholarly or scientific theory? 
 What criteria can be used to classify concepts and to analyze the concept of 
information? 
Responding to these fundamental issues constitutes the input methodological 
basis of the paper. 
First, we briefly deal with the concept of information in various domains, with 
literature considering the substance of the concept of information and its definitions, 
with the concept as such and with the scope of the concept of information. Then we 
provide the analysis of several important definitions of the concept of information, 
which were created within information science and related fields. From the collected 
data, some conclusions about the nature of the concept of information are deduced 
and an attempt is made to outline its future destiny in information science. The basic 
method consists in the conceptual analysis of definitions. 
2. A brief overview of the concept of information 
Information is a concept that is very used nowadays, namely in many areas [71]. It is 
not surprising that the experts struggle with its definition, and that its definitions are 
often quite different from each other. It is often shown in various knowledge contests, 
that it is difficult to explain particularly those words with which we meet today and 
every day. This is because these words become commonplace for us so much that we 
no longer even think about what they mean. At the same time, to know the meaning 
of the words that we use is absolutely necessary and it is the first step to eliminate 
many misunderstandings.  
The concept of information is mainly connected with the Aristotelian and 
Scholastic philosophy [13]. According to this philosophical direction, the essence of 
each material existence is composed of two metaphysical parts – form and materia. 
The substance (materia) is a passive principle which is able to receive the shapes. The 
form (shape) is an active principle which makes the thing what it is; it defines the 
substance or informs.  
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The concept of information has been revived with the advent of cybernetics [70], 
a science on control and communication in the systems. In the cybernetic concept, the 
information is a degree of the removal of uncertainty in the system, the degree of its 
orderliness. The analogy with the previous concept is obvious – but it is a 
mathematical theory.  
From the cybernetics, which is considered a theory permeating all scientific 
disciplines, the concept of information is spreading into many other disciplines. For 
example, cognitive psychology and science adopt it, and they understand the 
information as a psycho-physiological phenomenon and process under way in human 
consciousness. Information determined (informs) the knowing subject. 
With the arrival of the first universal machine - computer – a field arises which 
has the concept of information in its name, in Czech – informatics. Within the concept 
of this field, the information is data circulating in computers.  
Recently, it has also been a revival of this concept in the field of philosophy. Brno 
philosopher Josef Šmajs [66] sees the information as a constitutive factor of evolution. 
His philosophical reflection of information is based on cybernetic and genetic 
concept, however as it is a philosophical concept, it continues also (probably partly 
unconsciously) in the hylemorfic traditional approach. 
Last but not least, the concept of information also reaches into everyday language, 
which contributes to its unclarity. On the words that are used commonly, different 
meanings are gradually applied, which makes them seem understandable, but an 
attempt on their exact definition, however, usually ends in failure. 
The concept of information plays the key role in information science. There have 
been several paradigmatic turns [22] within the field, which have brought a new light 
into this term. During the first of them, the peripheral concept of information became 
a basic term, which replaced the former concept of document (because of this, the 
documentation has changed into information science) [13, p. 379]. In the context of 
the first turn, the information is perceived as something related to the information 
system, that means to the system, which is used for retrieving, sorting, storage, 
searching and dissemination of information (examples of such systems may be a 
library or an electronic database). The second turn, the so called cognitive turn, meant 
a deflection from the information system and shift of the focus to the user of 
information. Within its scope, the concept of information began to be considered in 
relation to the mental representation of the world, which creates a cognitive subject 
[7]. The third turn, social, focused its attention on the information creator and it began 
to describe the information as a social construct [38]. 
3. Overview of literature dealing with the definition and nature of the 
concept of information 
The definition of the concept of information differs between paradigms, but also 
within a single paradigm. That is why – as has been said above – attempts are being 
made to raise questions about the very possibility of providing a definition of concepts 
and the nature of the concept of information rather than merely to add another 
definition. 
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Capurro and Hjørland [13] refer to Wittgenstein’s claim that rather than 
attempting a classical definition using the proximate genus and a specific difference, 
it is better to look at how people use the terms. Etymological investigations of the 
given term are also important. Both authors consider each definition relative to the 
theory in whose framework it is created; one could say that a universal definition 
cannot be created – only a definition that works within a certain theoretical 
framework. They also deal with the concept of information as an interdisciplinary 
context, exploring the concept of information in the natural and social sciences and 
the humanities, and also in information science. They emphasize the differentiation of 
information as an object or thing and information as a subjective notion or sign that 
requires interpretation. 
Case [18] explores the concept of information using the concept of explication – 
a systematic attempt to determine the meaning of concepts. Explication, at the start of 
which we have only a general understanding of the meaning of the word, begins with 
examining the etymology of the term and continues through dictionary definitions to 
the definitions given by individual authors in the field. Thus, it is found that different 
authors define the given term differently, but also that some authors speak of the given 
term, but under a different name. Explication is achieved by extracting a common core 
from different definitions (top-down method) or by finding out what is common to 
subordinate concepts (bottom-up method). Case further deals with individual 
definitions of information and their problems, such as utility, physicality, 
structure/process, intentionality, truth. In conclusion, he asks whether we need a 
universal definition of the concept of information and whether information is not 
possibly a primitive concept that does not need to be defined but that is intuitively 
comprehensible. 
Day [23] deals with the concept of information from the perspective of the critical 
theory. He does not ask what information is, or whether it is good or bad, but he is 
interested in the connotations of this term. He demonstrates that authoritative texts on 
the concept of information use language to construct the social, utopian value of 
information as something factual and given that promotes privileged, totalitarian 
discourse. Similarly, Bernd Frohmann [32] stays away from the question of what 
information is – he considers it a superfluous concept. He shows that the concept of 
document is much more useful. Jonathan Furner [34] also considers the concept of 
information to be redundant, arguing that the notion of information is fully replaceable 
with concepts of philosophy of language. 
Our goal is to reflect on the concept of information and its influence on 
information science from the position of a classical theory of concepts and theory of 
definition and to explore what these assumptions, which most modern authors 
consider to be overcome, can bring us. 
4. Concept of concepts 
Concepts embody the foundation stones of every scholarly or scientific discipline. A 
particular field of science is markedly pre-determined by its own object; that is, its 
character emulates the properties of the investigated problem. Thus, a discipline arises 
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from the conceptual definition of the object to be examined, proceeding towards the 
subsequent derivation and classification of other concepts. 
Within logic and other disciplines, there are many approaches to concepts. 
Kavouras and Kokla [43] distinguish five basic theories of concepts (classical, 
probabilistic, theory-based, neoclassical, and conceptual atomism).  
Birger Hjørland [39] divides the approaches to concepts by epistemological 
schools (empiricism, rationalism, historicism, pragmatism), within which the 
concepts is discussed. W. G. Stock [63] assumes the Hjørland’s division (with the 
difference of calling the historicism a hermeneutics and adding the critical theory) and 
he displays it using the following scheme: 
 
 
Figure 1. Theory of concepts and the epistemology schools [63, p. 1953] 
We assume that the scientists who are trying to define and use certain concept, 
usually do not come out explicitly from a particular epistemological direction (in most 
texts defining the concept of information, the epistemological statement of the nature 
of concepts is missing) (for example [3]). It is clear that every effort to define scientific 
concepts must be based on certain epistemological assumptions; however, it is 
common, that these assumptions are only implied and the experts understand them 
rather intuitively, even if they try to change their angle of view on the given term. The 
works which analyze the epistemological bases, usually have no ambitions to define 
the concepts (for example [13]).  
We dare to say that the intuitive understanding of the terms, which is present in 
most of the works dealing with their definition, is closest to what Kavouras and Kokla 
[43] call the classical theory [see also 61]. How does such intuitive conception of 
concepts usually look like? Scientists usually consider concepts as a tool, which is 
used to recognize the reality and which is not identical with that reality (the concept 
means to them a representation of the reality in knowledge). They also recognize that 
the concept is abstract, therefore, that the concept does not cover all aspects of reality, 
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but only those that are essential and not dependent of specific material conditions. 
They usually think, that the concept is general (not everyone, but at least the one that 
is considered to be scientific), so that one concept describes a certain property that 
occurs in reality many times in different contexts. It is usually clear to them, that there 
is a difference between the concept and the word which labels the concept (it is 
evidenced by the simple fact that the same concept is described in different languages 
using different words). They also believe that the concept has a content, that is created 
by just that aspect of reality, expressed by that concept, and the extent which covers 
all objects, properties and relationships to which the aspect can be assigned. 
We can therefore assume, that the majority of scientists working with concepts, 
at least implicitly accept the definition of the concept, which can be formulated as 
follows: The concept is an abstract (and usually general) actualization of a part of the 
reality in knowledge that is for the purpose of human communication expressed 
through linguistic expressions (compare with [54, p. 38]). This classic concept of 
concepts can be illustrated on the reference triangle, which W.G. Stock [63, p. 1952] 
presents in this form: 
 
Figure 2. The reference triangle 
5. Scope of the concept 
Concepts can be classified using different criteria in many ways. One of them is the 
aspect of the content (it concerns one of the content aspects, not the content aspect as 
such), according to which the concepts are divided into univocal, analogical and 
equivocal [54, pp. 74-79]. In information science, these questions focused on the 
concept of information are known as the Capurro’s trilemma [14]. For several reasons, 
we consider this trilemma in information science unsolvable. (Strictly speaking, these 
issues cannot be solved within the framework of information science simply because 
they are ontological and epistemological issues that can be solved only in philosophy. 
But that is not the problem, because the special discipline always accepts, at least 
implicitly, some philosophical basis. Problem of these issues rests in the fact that they 
stand outside the scope of interest of the recent philosophy and therefore they become 
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incomprehensible even for philosophically oriented information scientist.) These 
reasons include especially: 
 
• these questions require relatively subtle metaphysical analysis, which is not 
only incomprehensible to the information scientist, but even to the majority 
of contemporary philosophers (only a handful of classically oriented 
researchers deal with them) (for example [61]); 
• various philosophical schools offer different solutions that are well reasoned, 
and it is not within the competence of the information scientists to evaluate 
them and decide for one of them (compare with [54,  pp. 72-79]). 
 
As much more feasible, we consider exploring the concepts, and the concept of 
information separately, in terms of aspect of the scope, which says the number of 
objects in reality to which the concept is assigned (i.e. number of objects the concept 
has within its scope). According to this criterion, we recognize individual, general and 
transcendental concepts [54, p. 66]. The individual concept has in its scope only one 
object, the general concept is assigned to two or more objects, and the transcendental 
concept belongs to all that exists or can exist. An example of the individual concept 
may be a concept of a particular human, which we describe by his name (Socrates). 
The general concepts are all the species concepts (dog, horse, human), and generic 
concepts (animal, plant). Transcendental notions contact reality as a whole 
(something, being, and so on) [16]. 
The nature of special science implies that the general concepts are in the center of 
its interest [55, p. 28]. Through the individual concept is not possible to cover general 
issues of the reality, the transcendental concepts cannot be part of a special science 
for its thematic narrowness [1, p. 35] that is because the special science is interested 
only in a certain part of the reality, which is being framed by concepts (the 
transcendental concepts include the entire reality, and therefore they are the domain 
of metaphysics, which deals with being as being) [17]. 
Our dilemma is: Is the concept of information general or transcendental? Let's 
think about it, before we analyze the definitions of the concept of information. 
Kenneth E. Boulding [9] talks about three basic models of the world, which 
fundamentally affected the scientific methodology. The first model is static, 
associated with the medieval view of the world, the second one is dynamic, which 
came to life with the development of Newtonian physics, and the third one is based 
on the principle of a feedback, in which the information plays a critical role. Ilya 
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers [57] also distinguish three phases of science. They 
associate the first one with a focus on mass, the second one with energy research and 
the third one with the discovery of information. 
According to these authors, the concept of information is not a concept that is 
used exclusively in a particular discipline, but it is a multidisciplinary term, which has 
its application in most of the natural and social sciences and even in the science that 
has a universal scope – in philosophy (see for example [28]). Philosophy covers the 
whole area of reality and the concept of information is not too narrow for it; special 
sciences divide among themselves the entire reality and yet the concept of information 
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plays an important role in almost every one of them. Philosophical reasoning leads to 
the fact, that the concept of information is considered to be transcendental. In the 
analytical part, we try to check whether this is really so. 
6. Definition of information 
The basic method of defining the concept is the definition. The definition is a mind 
product expressed by words, through which it is explained what is the defined object, 
represented by the concept (what is its essence) (compare with [51). 
The traditional approach to the definition, which is intuitive and is therefore 
usually implicitly accepted by all the authors who attempt to provide definitions of 
basic scientific terms, the conceptual explanation usually fits best. Definitions using 
the concept explanation consist of a defined concept (definiendum), the content of 
which is equivalent to the intersection of the two partial concepts contents (definiens). 
Combination of the partial concepts creates the concept identical to the concept 
defined (=df means equivalence by the definition) [63, p. 1952]; the meaning of the 
defined concept is explained by using partial notions. 
 
Concept = df partial concept1 ∩ partial concept2 
 
In this section, we mention some definitions of the term “information” created 
within the information science and related fields. The given overview is then analyzed. 
Thirtyone definitions of the term “information” created by different authors were 
selected for analysis. In the selection, we were guided by the distinction of basic 
approaches to defining and classifying the term of “information” stated by Marcia J. 
Bates [4] and Donald O. Case [18]. To this we add some definitions of information 
that we encountered in our research and that we find interesting. 
Bates distinguishes seven approaches: 
 
• Communicatory or semiotic 







The communicatory and semiotic concept can include the definitions of Bateson, 
Lossee, Madden, Nauta; A. D. Madden defines the information as “stimulus which 
expands or amends the World View of the informed” [48, p. 9]. G. Bateson says that 
information is “difference that makes difference” [5, p. 453]. According to D. Nauta, 
the information is “that which is common to all representations that are synonymous 
to the interpreter (synonymity is identity of meaning)” [53, p. 201]. R. Losee defines 
the information as “values in the characteristics of the processes’ output” [45,  p. 256]. 
An approach based on the activity is represented by A. Pratt, who says that the 
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information is “alternation of the Image which occurs when it receives a message” 
[56, p. 215]. 
Propositional definition of the information is given by R. Derr and F. Dretske. R. 
Derr defines the information as “abstract, meaningful representation of determinations 
which have been made of objects” [24, p. 491]. F. Dretske claims that the information 
“is capable of yielding knowledge” [25, p. 45]. 
Frederick Thomson provides the structural definition, which states that the 
information is “that result from applying the processes of organization to the raw 
material of experience, much like steel is obtained from iron ore”. [67, p. 305] 
Cornelius and Goguen represent the social definitions. Cornelius says that the 
information is “human artefact constructed and reconstructed within social situations” 
[21, p. 19). According to Goguen information is “of a configuration of signs for which 
members of some social group are accountable” [36, p. 31]. 
Bates, Buckland and MacKay represent the multi-type approach. According to 
Bates the information is “pattern of organization of matter and energy” [3, p. 1033]. 
Buckland defines the information as “quality attributed to things” [11, p. 355]. 
MacKay says that the information is “which determines form” [47, p. 160].  
A different classification of the definitions of information is provided by Donald 
O. Case [18], who notes 5 aspects related to the definition of information: 
 
• utility,  
• physicality,  
• structure/process,  
• intentionality, and  
• truth. 
 
In terms of utility, information is often defined as a reduction of uncertainty. 
Boauazza argues that the most useful definition of information is that information is 
“that which reduces uncertainty” [8, p. 145]. Wersing and Neveling state that 
information is “reduction of uncertainty caused by communicated data” [69, p. 138]. 
Rogers defines information as “patterned matter-energy that affect the probabilities of 
alternatives available to an individual making a decision” [59, p. 85]. For Hirshleifer 
the term of information is defined as “a negative measure of uncertainty” [37, p. 31]. 
Some authors believe that the essential condition of information is its physicality. 
Krippendorff places information in relation to the concept of energy and argues that 
information is a “measure of the (intellectual) work required to distinguish, to a degree 
better then chance, among a set of initially uncertain possibilities” [44, p. 50].  
Information is also often defined in connection with the concepts of structure or 
process. Belkin and Robertson argue that information is “that which is capable of 
transforming structure” [6, p. 198]. Fox criticizes the concept of information as a 
process that changes the structure and posits that information from an ontological 
point of view are “propositions [the identification of which] depends on contextual 
factors” [30, p. 213]. 
Many authors associate information with intentionality, that is, the intention of 
the author or the recipient to communicate. Information as part of communication 
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must be intentional. Primarily, however, it is a property of communication, so there is 
no definition of information that explicitly states intentionality. 
Truth is often presented as a condition of information. According to Luciano 
Floridi, information is “well-formed, meaningful and truthful data” [28]. Budd argues 
that information consists of “meaningful, communicative actions that aim at truth 
claims and conditions.” [12, p. 56]. 
Now let us focus on the selection of interesting definitions itself. We can divide 
them into three groups. The first group contains authors who understand information 
as something objective and do not consider the human subject. The second group 
includes authors for whom the human subject is an inherent part of the information 
process; the information is mainly on the part of the subject. The third group consists 
of authors who, while they do not deny the role of a human subject, nevertheless see 
information on the part of a record of human knowledge through a sign system, either 
identifying it directly with this record or with its meaning. 
First, Gackowski attempts to exclude subjectivity from the definition of 
information, which he perceives as a “factor in form ... not yet available” [35, p. 172]. 
An objectivist and structural conception of information is offered by Luhn, who 
claims that information is “a structure-(form-)enriching  message (which gets received 
by a system) in conjunction with the causal structure-(form-)giving overall process 
(all systems and messages)” [46, p. 154]. A similar view is held by Stonier, who 
understands information as a “capacity to organize a system – or to maintain it in an 
organised state” [65, p. 26]. 
Second, the founder of cybernetics, Wiener understands information as a process 
that takes place between a human and the world and defines it as “content of what is 
exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our adjustment felt upon 
it” [70, p. 16]. According to Faithorne, information is an “attribute of the receiver’s 
knowledge and interpretation of the signal, not of the sender’s, nor some omniscient 
observer’s nor of the signal itself” [26, p. 255]. 
In Resnikoff’s view, information comes into existence by abstracting from 
material conditions. Hence, a subject that performs the abstraction is taken into 
consideration. Resnikoff argues that information is “what remains after one abstracts 
from the material aspects of physical reality” [58, p. 2]. 
Third, Bar-Hillel elaborates directly on Shannon’s theory of information and 
incorporates a semantic dimension. In his concept, information is “what is expressed 
by the signal sequence” [2, p. 94]. Farradane considers information as a material 
object and claims that information is a “physical surrogate of knowledge” [27, p. 17]. 
Similarly, Meadows defines information as “data processed and assembled into a 
meaningful form” [52, p. 105]. 
For clarity, we present the individual definitions in the table: 
 
Author Species = 
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genus 
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... of determinations 










of the receiver’s 
knowledge and 
interpretation of the 
signal, not of the 
sender’s, nor some 
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of the signal itself 
Farradane 





Floridi [28] data 
well-formed, meaningful 
and truthful 
Fox [30, p. 
213] 
propositions 
depends on contextual 
factors 
Gackowski 
[35, p. 172] 
factor 





of a configuration of 
signs for which members 
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Author Species = 
Proximate 
genus 
∩ Specific difference 
alternatives available to 





to organize a system – or 
to maintain it in an 
organised state 
Thompson 
[67, p. 305] 
product 
that results from applying 
the processes of 
organization to the raw 
material of experience, 
much like steel is 
obtained from iron ore 
Wersing a 
Neveling 
[69, p. 138] 
reduction  





of what is exchanged with 
the outer world as we 
adjust to it, and make our 
adjustment felt upon it 
Table 1. Definitions of information 
7. Conceptual Analysis 
The method used is conceptual analysis. When pursuing the given objectives, we 
combined into more general categories the concepts present in the place of the defined 
object within individual definitions, thus obtaining 6 categories. These are as follows: 
 
• structure, orderliness, organization; 
• cause of the organization; 
• expansion of the knowledge; 
• knowledge, concept; 
• sign recording of the knowledge; 





















Bates x      
Bateson  x     
Belkin and 
Robertson 
 x     
Boauazza  x     
Buckland     x  
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Budd     x  
Cornelius     x  
Derr    x   
Dretske   x    
Fairthorne    x   
Farradane     x  
Floridi     x  
Fox      x 
Gackowski  x     
Goguen      x 
Hirshleifer x      
Krippendorff    x   
Luhn  x     
Losee   x    
MacKay  x     
Madden   x    
Meadows     x  
Nauta      x 
Pratt   x    
Resnikoff    x   
Rogers     x  
Stonier x      
Thompson     x   
Wersing and 
Neveling 
 x     
Wiener  x     
Table 2. Content categories 
Subsequently, we attempted to establish what the concepts are in view of scope 
and to find such notions whose content and scope resemble the given concepts. The 
results can be conveniently defined within the two points below. 
 
1) the concept of information somehow addresses the entire reality; 
2) the concept of information is very close to some concepts used in philosophy 
– this fact is noted by Jonathan Furner [34], who claims, that the concept of 
information is in information science unnecessary, because all its meanings 
can be substituted by the concepts used in philosophy of the language – , or 
to the multidisciplinary terms, which relate to the whole lot of scientific 
disciplines. 
 
First:  We can note, that the information is defined as either 1) a structure, order, 
organization of something, 2) or eventually as a reason for this organization, or as 
something which a) broadens the knowledge about something, b) is a sign recording 
of this knowledge c) is the meaning of this sign recording. The universality of this 
concept is obvious: all that exists has some kind of a structure or organization, and we 
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can have a knowledge about everything that is or can be (this postulate will be 
explained further). The universal character of the concept of information is obvious 
from the choice of the proximate genus in the listed definitions. A completely general 
genus (expressed by the words “what” or “that”) is used, and the real determination is 
contained only in a specific difference. In all other cases, there are concepts which 
describe very general subjects and which can hardly be considered to be special 
concepts related to the specific discipline (pattern, difference, quality, artefact, 
representation, attribute, surrogate, data, factor, interpretation, value, message, 
stimulus, alternation, capacity, product, content). 
Second: different definitions resemble a line of concepts related to ontology, 
epistemology, semantics, and other disciplines, which have universal or 
multidisciplinary character. Bateson’s concept “difference that makes difference” 
points to the basic categories of the metaphysics, which asks what is identity and 
difference  [15]. “Pattern of organization of matter and energy” by M. Bates, Stonier’s 
“capacity to organize” or Hirshleifer’s “negative measure of uncerntainty” are very 
close to what the Aristotelian philosophy calls a form [50]. MacKay’s concept “that 
which determines form”, Luhn’s “structure-(form-)enriching message”, Gackowski’s  
“factor in form”, Wiener’s “content of what is exchanged with the outer world”, 
Belkin’s and Robertson’s “that which is capable of transforming structure”, 
Boauazza’s “that which reduces uncerntainty”, Wersing’s and Neveling’s “reduction 
of uncerntainty caused by communicated data” resemble Aristoteles’ concept of 
formal cause (i.e. the cause responsible for the form, shape of the things) [49, p. 91]. 
Dretsky’s “what is capable of yielding knowledge”, Madden’s “stimulus which 
expands or amends the World View”, Pratt’s “alternation of the Image” appear to be 
related with the spiritual change (immutation) concept, used by Thomas Aquinas and 
who writes: 
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. 
Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being 
received according to its natural existence, into the thing 
immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas 
spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being 
received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing 
immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does 
not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, 
a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the 
sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. [68, p. 393] 
Derr’s “abstract, meaningful representation”, Thompson’s “product that results 
from applying the processes of organization to the raw material of experience”, 
Losee’s “values in the characteristics of the processes’ output”, Resnikoff’s “what 
remains after one abstracts from the material aspects of physical reality”, Faithorney’s 
“attribute of the receiver’s knowledge and interpretation of the signal”, Krippendorff’s  
“measure of the (intellectual) work required to distinguish, to a degree better then 
chance, among a set of initially uncertain possibilities” have close to what is in 
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epistemology and logic called a knowledge or a concept [54, p. 38]. Goguen’s 
“interpretation of a configuration of signs”, Bar-Hillel’s “what is expressed by the 
signal sequence”, Nauta’s “that which is common to all representations that are 
synonymous to the interpreter” resemble the the concept of meaning [62], used by 
many disciplines (we can also put the  Cornelius’ definition in this category, according 
to which the information is a “human artefact constructed and reconstructed within 
social situations”, if Cornelius understands the artefact as something immaterial – it 
is not quite obvious). Finally Farradan’s “physical surrogate of knowledge”, 
Buckland’s “quality attributed to things”, Floridi’s “well-formed, meaningful and 
truthful data” and Meadows’ “data processed and assembled into a meaningful form” 
are concepts related to the concept of document [10], which is used in librarianship, 
archival, museum science and other fields (if the Cornelius’ artefact is some 
immaterial thing, then we can place his definition into this category). We can 
transparently show it in the following table: 
 
Concept ~ Concept Authors 
Information ~ 
Difference Bateson 
Form Bates, Stonier, Hirshleifer 
Formal cause Gackowski, MacKay, Luhn, Wiener 
Spiritual 
change 
Dretske, Madden, Pratt 
Concept 
Derr, Faithorne, Losee, Resnikoff, 
Thompson 
Meaning Bar-Hillel, Goguen, Nauta (Cornelius) 
Document Buckland, Farradane, Meadows (Cornelius) 
Table 2. Information and related concepts 
What are the consequences for the concept of information in terms of its range? 
If the information is a structure or organization, then it must be included in all that is 
or may be (at least in the material world), because we can hardly imagine a thing that 
wouldn’t be structured and organized. The total lack of order is nothing existing. 
If the information is the knowledge about something, recording of that knowledge, 
or meaning of the recording, it is clear that we can have information about everything 
that is or can be. To admit the existence of reality, which we cannot have any 
knowledge about means having a knowledge about this reality (at least about its 
potential existence) (compare with [33, p. 16]. At that moment, however, such a 
postulate negates itself. 
If we consider philosophy to be a universal science [1, p. 35], which is interested 
in the whole of reality, then the result of the philosophical investigation is information 
on everything that is. If every part of the reality (at least the material) is the subject of 
a special science, then a summary of information from particular disciplines will 
contact at least all that is, and that has material character. 
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From this perspective, the concept of information seems to be a transcendental 
term, whether it is understood in ontological or epistemological sense. By different 
ways, Michael Buckland, comes to a similar conclusion, when he writes:  
If anything is, or might be, informative, then everything is, or 
might well be, information. In which case calling something 
“information” does little or nothing to define it. If everything is 
information, then being information is nothing special. [11, p. 
356] 
8. The concept and the future of information science 
Michal Lorenz [72] lists 7 problem areas of information science, of which two are 
relevant for our analysis: 
 
1) the problem of delimitation, 
2) the problem of the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
Information science can be defined classically, as described above when we dealt 
with the definition of information, or pragmatically through the problems it addresses. 
Because we are inclined towards classic understanding of concepts and definitions, 
the crucial question for us is whether we can define information science as an 
autonomous discipline. By way of exemplification, let us have a look at a few 
definitions of information science. One of the most well-known and long-serving 
definitions is Harold Bork’s definition: 
Information science is that discipline that investigates the 
properties and behavior of information, the forces governing the 
flow of information, and the means of processing information for 
optimum accessibility and usability. It is concerned with that body 
of knowledge relating to the origination, collection, organization, 
storage, retrieval, interpretation, transmission, transformation 
and utilization of information. [73, p. 3] 
In International Encyclopedia of Information and Library Science, R. T. Bottle 
defines information science as: 
A discipline that investigates the characteristics of information 
and the nature of the information transfer process, whilst not 
losing sight of the practical aspects of collecting, collating and 
evaluating information and organizing its dissemination through 
appropriate intellectual apparatus and technology. [74, p. 295] 
The last of the selected definitions was proposed by Chaim Zins: 
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Information science is focused on the meta-knowledge aspect of 
objective knowledge, particularly on its technological and 
mediatory aspects. It expolores the phenomena, objects, and 
conditions that facilitate the accessibility to knowledge. [75] 
According to Luciano Floridi [76], a field is autonomous if it meets the following 
conditions: 
 
1) the field examines a unique topic and represents an autonomous field of 
research, 
2) the field approaches its topics in a new, novel way that is reflected in its own, 
unique methodology, 
3) the field is so stabilized that it is able to withstand all attempts to reduce the 
field of its interests to another field, thus demonstrating its adequate 
significance, 
4) the field is broad and rich enough, so it can be organized into sub-fields in 
which specialists can specialize. 
 
Conditions 2 and 4 are met. Information science has its own methods, including 
in particular bibliometry. The field also allows for a variety of specializations, such 
as information policy or information retrieval, as Lorenz points out [72]. The problem 
is with condition 1. Although most authors agree that the unique phenomenon that 
information science explores is information, there is no consensus on what 
information actually is, and there are some authors who identify as fundamental 
concept of information science another concept (knowledge, document). As regards 
the 3rd condition, information science is threatened by informatics (research of 
information systems and information retrieval), psychology and cognitive science 
(representation and organization of knowledge), management (information and 
knowledge management), pedagogy (information education, e-learning systems) or 
sociology (information society). 
Our finding about the concept of information may shed light on the nature of the 
anomaly in information science which consists in the fact the information scientists 
are unable to agree (even within specific paradigms) on the definition of the concept 
that they consider to be the key one and in the problem that the autonomy of 
information science is constantly called into question. The concept of information is 
multidisciplinary, said in the words of the traditional logic, transcendental term. 
Information science defines itself as a special discipline (special sciences deal with a 
certain segment of reality and their concepts relate to this part; universal sciences such 
as philosophy are, on the other hand, interested in the whole of reality), namely one 
of the social sciences [20]. It appears that information science is a scientific discipline 
that works with transcendental term. We dare to consider such a situation to be a 
serious methodological problem. 
Regardless to whether the information scientists themselves recognize this fact or 
not, there are attempts within information science to solve the problems with the 
concept of information, which – as it seems – respond to the problem associated with 
91
JIOS, VOL. 43. NO. 1 (2019), PP. 73-98
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCES 
  
the scope of the term. They can be divided into three categories. In various works 
from the field of information science, we can hear, that it is necessary 
 
1) for information science to undergo a transformation; the main concept defines 
the nature of the science; if the information is a universal concept, then 
information science must be a universal science too – creation of so called 
social epistemology, which aspires to become a general methodological 
solution for information science [31] can be considered to be such an attempt; 
2) for the concept of information to undergo a transformation; if information 
science is a special science, it cannot work with a universal concept, so it is 
necessary to narrow the concept of information to the needs of this discipline 
(see [64, pp. 66-70]; 
3) for the concept of information to be replaced by another concept, which would 
clearly define the nature and borders of this discipline [32]. 
 
First: in information science, there is a long-time tension between the theoretical 
frame, which is tied to the concept of information and the specific sub-disciplines, 
which have constituted themselves because of the needs of praxis (typical example is 
the librarianship) and which did not use the concept of information and de facto still 
have not been using it (librarians keep talking about mediating information, but what 
they do, is still rather working with documents – documentation). Birger Hjørland and 
Rafael Capurro [13, p. 379] think, that behind the substitution of the concept of 
document by the concept of information, which led to the fact that the documentation 
had developed itself to information science, is the attempt to adapt to the new 
disciplines, such as computer science, where the concept of information is used. In 
these disciplines is the concept of information defined by a narrow technical way, 
which is not suitable for the discipline which generally deals with mediating 
information. Therefore, information science had to define the concept of information 
broader, and as it can be seen, the concept is too broad. This led some scientists to 
start associating information science with the cognitive science (so called cognitive 
turn), and also with epistemology, philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge 
[38]. This leads to two problems. The first one rests in the fact, that information 
science is moving away from its traditional sub-disciplines, like for example the 
librarianship. The second problem is, that it is not clear whether information science, 
when it associates with other disciplines, manages to keep its identity, or if it would 
dissolve in these disciplines as their sub-discipline. Beside it, there are attempts to 
create the most general science about information – philosophy of information [29], 
or a multidisciplinary discipline, which deals with the concept of information from 
the position of various disciplines (so called unified theory of information) [40], [41]. 
The entire process is logical, because the science has the same nature as its concepts; 
if the concept of information is transcendental, ontological and epistemological, 
information science must be also such discipline – so it should transform itself into 
philosophy of information. If it doesn’t want to do so, (and it probably doesn’t want, 
because it would mean even greater separation from the traditional disciplines, from 
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which it originated), it is forced to do something with its fundamental concept. But 
that leads us to the next two points. 
Second: there are attempts to narrow the general concept of information for the 
purpose of information science. M. Bates [3], who defines information as a “pattern 
of organization of matter and energy”; further classifies this broad concept according 
to various criteria and she finds, that the concept of information, which is in the centre 
of information science is always closest to what we call “exosomatic recorded 
information”, i.e. information in the form of signs recorded on a tangible carrier. 
Michael Buckland [11] thinks that the subject of information science is “information 
as thing”, i.e. an item which can be informative (book, museum exhibit etc.) Peter 
Ingwersen [42] and Jiří Cejpek [19] think similarly. They introduce the concept of 
“potential information.” By the “potential information” they mean the sign recording, 
which can grow into the knowledge, if it meets a human mind. 
There are two problems associated with these attempts. The first problem rests in 
the fact, that narrowing the concept of information will not relieve us from having the 
concept of information – we can narrow only what we have in a broad form. But as 
we have seen, information science doesn’t have a general concept of information in a 
widely acceptable form (not even within the narrow frame of each paradigms). The 
second problem is, that the concept of information in its narrowed sense, as it is 
understood by Bates, Buckland, Ingwersen and Cejpek, is actually identical with the 
concept of document, associated with the traditional documentation [10]. So there is 
a question, why not to return to the original “document” notion. And so we get to the 
point three. 
Third: within information science, there are attempts to leave the concept of 
information and to return back to the concept of document [32]. This solution, even 
though it is against the mind of the majority of the information scientists, because it 
means the necessity to admit, that introducing the concept of information was a dead 
end, looks quite optimistic on the first glance. However, there are some serious 
objections against it, which we can formulate as follows: 
 
a. information science loses its identity as a science and it will be basically 
turned into the technique for working with documents (it will acknowledge 
that the attempt to elevate the practical field to the field of science failed); 
b. entire fields will drop out of information science, for example research of 
information behaviour cannot be reduced to research of “behaviour when 
searching for documents” – it’s much more complex field (the question is 
whether the information behaviour doesn’t belong more into the psychology 
and sociology); 
c. in the library practice, we cannot describe all types of services as documentary 
– when the librarian finds a certain fact, and he verbally passes it to the user, 
it is not a mediation of a document, if the document is not understood so 
widely, so that we consider an oral communication as a document too (one of 
the characteristics of the document, however, is its permanence, so a spoken 
word does not fit into the category of classically understood document). 
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We can see that there are significant problems associated not only with the 
concept of information, but also with attempts to address these problems.  
9. Proposed perspectives 
Despite the above-indicated conditions, we assume that the most viable solution rests 
in combining together approaches 1 and 2.  In this context, the following steps appear 
to be inevitable: 
 
1) accepting certain universality of information science;  
2) finding a concept of information that will identify information science as a 
full-value discipline.  
 
Such an approach means that the term of information is to be defined as a 
transcendental notion, categorizing information science as a transdisciplinary meta-
field (this procedure nevertheless requires information science to significantly exploit 
and rely on universal science, namely, philosophy and its subdisciplines, 
epistemology in particular; yet we can prospectively find such characteristics of the 
concept of information that will firmly establish information science within the broad 
set of disciplines. 
10. Conclusion 
The aim of our article was to analyze the concept of information, which is an anomaly 
in information science, from the epistemological and logical positions. Therefore, we 
were briefly acquainted with sorting the concepts in terms of scope. Then, we have 
analyzed 31 definitions of information and have concluded that the information is 
likely a concept that somehow contacts all reality, so that it is a concept which the 
classical logic would call a transcendental concept. This fact we, bearing in mind that 
information science is a special field, identified as a serious methodological problem, 
which has three possible solutions: transformation of information science into the 
universal science, narrowing the concept of information to a special concept and 
replacement of the concept of information by another one. 
Each solution has its drawbacks. In the first case, it is clear that the established 
field may be very difficult to transform into another one. The second option does not 
solve the problem with the concept of information, whose general meaning is still in 
the game. Moreover, it appears that attempts to limit the concept of information leads 
to copying what is meant by the “document”, and therefore to the return to traditional 
documentation. The third solution calls for the introduction of a new concept, to which 
the concept of document aspires (it is therefore a concept rather old-new). However, 
there are many problems associated with information science identity, with its scope 
and praxis. 
It was not our purpose to resolve issues associated with the use of the concept of 
information in information science (the solution proposed by us is just a hint), but 
rather to point out the causes of this anomaly, contribute to the epistemological and 
94
JIOS, VOL. 43. NO. 1 (2019), PP. 73-98
STODOLA THE SCOPE OF THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION... 
  
logical debate over the nature of this concept and outline possible directions which 
information science could take in addressing these issues. We believe that the 
explanation of the problem with the concept of information, which lies in the fact, that 
the universal concept is used in a particular discipline, is properly justified and that it 
brings more light into the nature of the problem. We are leaving the question of how 
to address the given problems to further professional debate. 
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